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International Human Rights and the
International Law Project: The Revolving
Door of Academic Discourse and
Practitioner Politics
MAXWELL O. CHIBUNDU*

Anniversaries are moments of reflection. In the best of the
tradition, one looks backwards not simply to recapture the moment of
creation, but to see how much the visions of the creators have turned
into reality. The retrospective gaze thus is valuable as a pedagogic
tool. Anniversaries are also moments for seeking to chart course
corrections; that is to say, for renewal and, possibly, reorientation. A
panel devoted to critique and evaluation is required simultaneously to
engage in both.
In addition to being the 60th anniversary of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 2008 was a personal
anniversary of sorts. I had my introduction into the legal academy in
the Fall of 1988. We were at the tail end of the discursive project of
the Critical Legal Studies Movement, and just beginning to take
seriously the notion that personal histories and stories were valid
tools in legal research and commentary.1 One of the few perquisites

* Professor, University of Maryland School of Law. I would like to thank and extend my
congratulations to the members of this founding Editorial Board of the Maryland Journal of
International Law for making the restoration of the Journal a reality, and for their excellent
editorial assistance with what follows. The remaining errors, of course, are mine.
1. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for
Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2411 (1989); Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling,
and the Rule of Law: New Words, Old Wounds, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2099 (1989); Richard K.
Sherwin, A Matter of Voice and Plot: Belief and Suspicion in Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L.
REV. 543 (1988).
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of the profession is to attend conferences that are more or less paid
for by one’s employer. I readily recall my second conference. It was
sponsored by the American Society of International Law, which was
then looking for ways of making itself again relevant to the
propagation of international law in the United States, an undertaking,
it should be said, that it has succeeded handily in doing. Regardless
of the topic under discussion at the conference (e.g., writing about
and/or the teaching of Public International Law, the place of
International Economic Law in the curriculum, getting published in
―mainstream‖ journals, library acquisition policies for international
law, and the like), the persistent and constant refrain was the
―marginalization‖ of international law within the academy.2 A new
entrant, I could scarcely have imagined a less auspicious start. And
yet, as we now can say with complete confidence, 1989 marked the
start of a new order in international relations and international law.
The structuring of the politics of the post-Cold War world order,
international concern and cooperation over the environment, the
emergence of a significantly enlarged and deepened European
Community, the emergence of an economically dynamic China, and a
more ambitious take on trade negotiations of the Uruguay Round on
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade were all looming on the
horizon, and were to usher in unprecedented material for international
law scholarship over the next two decades. But no one topic in
international law has held the imagination of international lawyers
during these decades as have issues related to what has come to be
termed ―International Human Rights,‖ and the UDHR is undoubtedly
the birth mother of its current conception.
Although a student of international law, I am not a particularistic
scholar of international human rights. I shall therefore take
advantage of the tripartite confluence of the restart of the Maryland
Journal of International Law, the University of Maryland School of
Law’s celebration of the 60th anniversary of the adoption of the
UDHR, and the occasion of my now indisputable attainment of the
age of majority as a law school teacher to ruminate on the ways the

2. Many suggestions at the conference related to collaborative cross-disciplinary research
and writing by international law academics with other academics such as those involved in
the study of international relations and international economics—suggestions that were taken
up by many legal scholars whose works are now well mainstreamed in the legal academy.
Indeed, there is now a journal dedicated to the intersections of International Law and
International Relations, the Journal of International Law and International Relations.
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objectives and methods of international human rights scholarship
intersect with and influence the broader liberal internationalist project
in the making of a postmodern international legal order. In the
process, I shall try to say something about the possible lessons of the
trajectory of human rights discourse from the UDHR to Guantánamo
Bay, the significance for that discourse of the increased participation
of human rights ―activists‖ and ―practitioners‖ as instructors in the
legal academy, and provide some reflections on what these relationships say about the teaching to and consumption of human rights
discourse by our students. The story that I shall tell will differ, I
think, in some important ways from much of the received wisdom
that is often passed on in International Human Rights courses from
one class of students to the next, but I believe it is just as accurate,
and if it helps spur reflection among our students, then I shall have
achieved the objective of my participation on this panel.
FROM THE UDHR TO GUANTÁNAMO BAY
The idea of human rights, like those of ―truth,‖ ―justice,‖ and
―peace‖ (and, as this is largely an American audience, one might add
―motherhood and apple pie‖), is, as clearly evidenced by the
presentations in this conference, beloved by all. And yet, few are (or,
at least, ought to be) content to rest on the obvious goodness of all
who tout human rights, and the equally clear evil of those who flout
it. The shrillness with which the assertion of, and opposition to, its
undifferentiated ―universality‖ are sometimes articulated, and the
defensiveness with which its pedigree is proclaimed or denied
suggests some level of anxiety about what it means to believe in or
subscribe to an idea. Only those who believe that there are inherently
good or bad persons, good or bad societies, good or bad cultures find
it easy to dismiss disagreements about human rights in Manichaean
terms. A more helpful explanation for those disagreements, notwithstanding a general trans-cultural commitment to the ―inherent dignity
of the person,‖ is that there is in fact a broad gulf between liking an
idea or concept and implementing it. An idea—at least one that is
deemed to be ―progressive‖—must challenge the distribution of
power and resources in a given place and time, while its implementation, if it is to succeed, must be reconciled with those very realities.
The method for mounting the challenge and for effecting the
reconciliation vary with intellectual disciplines, among lawyers and
philosophers deconstructing and applying a particularized text is
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central to the process.
And here lies the central relevance of the UDHR for international
human rights. It may be that the pedigree of contemporary
international human rights commences with the intellectual ferment
of Enlightenment Europe, as expressed by such authors as Locke,
Rousseau, and Kant and the declarations of the French Revolution;3
or, it may be that the pedigree dates further back to the writings of the
Canonists of Bologna in the late European ―Middle Ages‖4 or even to
the philosophical works of Plato, Aristotle, and the Greeks.5 Nor
does one necessarily have to subscribe to the view of the privileging
of human rights over other values being either exclusively occidental
or otherwise in order to accept the special place the UDHR has in the
canon of human rights claims. Its primary value is that unlike any of
these other iterations, the UDHR speaks directly and in contemporary
prose to the concerns of our moment. It speaks to the claims for
humane governance that members of post-World War II societies
have vis-à-vis those who exercise political control over their lives.
The Declaration does affirm ―the inherent dignity and . . . the equal
and inalienable rights of all members of the human family,‖ but it
does so not as an end in and of itself, but as the basis for ―freedom,
justice and peace.‖6
Nor does the UDHR simply dwell on announcing lofty ideals. To
the contrary, it is highly particularistic in fitting those ideals within its
own temporal and spatial environment. Obviously the product of the
concerns generated by the waging of World War II and the politics of
the Great Depression that had preceded it, the UDHR proclaims that
―freedom from fear and want‖ is the ―highest aspiration of the
common people.‖7 It tells us that mass disregard and contempt for
human rights have resulted in barbarous acts that have outraged the
conscience of humankind, and that we need the rule of law to protect
human rights so that ―man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as
3. In this symposium issue, for example, see Peter G. Danchin, Who Is the “Human” in
Human Rights? The Claims of Culture and Religion, 24 MD. J. INT’L L. 99 (2009).
4. See, e.g., James Griffin, Are Human Rights Parochial?, in PAROCHIALISM AND
DIFFERENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Mortimer Sellers ed., forthcoming 2009).
5. Cf. Hirad Abtahi, Reflections on the Ambiguous Universality of Human Rights: Cyrus
the Great’s Proclamation as a Challenge to the Athenian Democracy’s Perceived Monopoly
on Human Rights, 36 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 55 (2007); Danchin, supra note 3.
6. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), art. 25, U.N. Doc.
A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
7. Id. pmbl.
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a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression.‖8 Furthermore, considerations of realpolitik are squarely presented as
justifications for the announcement of these rights. Thus, the
Declaration asserts that because it is essential to promote the development of friendly relations among states, and because members of the
United Nations not only have affirmed under the Charter the inherent
dignity and equal rights of all persons (men and women alike), but
also have committed themselves ―to promote social progress and
better standards of life in larger freedom,‖ the UDHR thus stands as
―a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations.‖9
This is the backdrop for its prescriptions. Strikingly, they are not
articulated as commands or even instructions, but as urgings:
[E]very individual and every organ of society, keeping this
Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching and
education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and
by progressive measures, national and international, to secure
their universal and effective recognition and observance, both
among the peoples of Member States themselves and among
the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.10
Equally striking (and again as a reflection of the ethos of the
moment), the provisions of the UDHR do not merely encourage the
recognition of those libertarian principles or ―freedoms‖ that
simultaneously promote collective self-governance while constraining the powers of the resulting government, they also articulate an
affirmatively socialized vision of the role of government in providing
material resources for the welfare of the community. These
approaches embody not so much a generalized vision of the
relationship of the individual to the state that transcends time and
space, but the particular experiences of mid-20th century socioeconomic politics. Thus, the UDHR does not simply assert some
generalized vision of liberty, equality, or fraternity, but takes the
trouble to spell out in quite specific terms a particularized conception
of human dignity that is firmly rooted in the historical events and
mindsets of the epoch of its crafting. It grounds its faith in the
efficacy of human rights as a means for doing away with the

8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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injustices of non-participatory politics,11 unequal distribution of
wealth,12 and impermissible discrimination on account of religion,
race, language, sex, nationality, or, notably, ―property, birth or
status.‖13
To acknowledge the explicitness and specificity of the text is not to
frame that text as a set of legal commands. To the contrary, in many
ways, the genius of the UDHR lies in its ability to capture, present,
and recommend these broad aspirations not as legal obligations, but
as goals that are worth striving for within a collaborative framework.
This model of persuasion may be contrasted with an alternative
model—that of coercion—in which behavior is hierarchically
decreed and, whenever possible, coercively enforced. The debate
between these two competing models for understanding the UDHR, I
want to suggest, is emblematic of a much broader debate within the
discourse of the modern international law project. Furthermore, as I
shall show, the move from the one to the other is dictated as much by
a sense of material power as by any depth of moral commitment to
the principles at issue.
That the lawyers, diplomats, and politicians who crafted the
UDHR operated within the persuasive model of international relations is borne out not only by the text of the declaration, but also by
the history of the international human rights project in the wake of
the UDHR. Beyond the aspirational statements of the UDHR, the
Project contemplated the negotiation, adoption, and enforcement of
legally binding treaties and covenants. These actions were premised
on the notion of law as the product of good-faith cooperation among
and cooptation of states. The underlying assumption was that states
were equally desirous of coexisting in a peaceful international society
and that the function of international law was to provide the order
within which that coexistence can occur. The nature of the state, and

11. See, e.g., UDHR, supra note 6, arts. 3–5 (right to life, liberty, and security of the
person), arts. 6–12 (right to equal protection under law), arts. 13–21 (right to privacy,
movement, free association, self-expression, self-definition, and full participation in the
political life of one’s national community), arts. 27–28 (right to education and to the
enjoyment of the cultural life and scientific advances of the community).
12. Id. arts. 22–26 (right to work, just remuneration, ―equal pay for equal work,‖ social
security, rest and leisure, a standard of living adequate to the maintenance of health and
well-being, and, for mothers and children, the right to ―special care and assistance‖).
13. Id. art. 2 (―Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.‖).
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particularly the concept of sovereignty, rendered unlikely the operation within international society of an Austinian conception of law.
Of necessity then, law, if it were to exist within international society,
had to be arrived at through the willing and voluntary cooperation of
states rather than coerced compliance.
The Human Rights Project thus proceeded by negotiating and
urging the adoption of treaties and covenants. Some were a lot easier
to obtain than others. Reflecting the immediate experiences of the
international society that had just waged a scorched-earth war, the
Conventions on Genocide,14 on the methods for the waging of war
(―Geneva Conventions‖),15 and on treatment of refugees16 were
readily negotiated and widely adopted. But despite the broad acclaim
of the aspirational statements of the UDHR, negotiating and adopting
the implementing Covenants proved to be a much more prolonged
undertaking. It is worth pausing to ask why this was so, for in the
answers may lie some lessons not only for human rights lawyers, but
also for international law scholars and practitioners of our current
moment.
Among human rights scholars, it is commonplace to attribute the
long gestation of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) and of the International Covenant on Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) on the geopolitics of relations
between the ―East‖ (i.e., states dominated by the Soviet Union), and
the ―West‖ (i.e., members of the various alliances cobbled by the
United States). These two groups, it is said, differed over the
primacy of rights, with the West preferring to give preeminence to
civil and political rights, while the East sought to privilege economic
rights. The adoption of two covenants, rather than a single unified
treaty, is thus presented as a compromise, with the UDHR standing in
as the authentic and definitive statement of what an undivided and

14. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 2, Dec.
9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
15. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; Geneva
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75
U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
16. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189
U.N.T.S. 150.
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non-politicized international community genuinely wanted. As with
any conventional wisdom, one can doubtless muster support for this
view, but only by ignoring or overlooking other trends that were at
play.
At its core, the horrors experienced in the waging of World War II
(including the holocaust and the mass displacements of whole
population groups), and the socio-economic upheavals leading up to
it, made addressing human rights concerns in the wake of the war
virtually unavoidable. Yet, enshrining moral norms as legal rules
demands the existence of a particular kind of society—a political
community. The shared experiences of the war, buttressed by the
Nuremberg and Tokyo trials, and of course the formation of the
United Nations, initially may have provided the illusion that international society indeed had congealed into a political community, but
the unreality of the illusion was manifested not only by the existence
of aggressively competing political economic and military blocs, but
also by the emergence and maturation of new members and interests
within the international society.
The evidence of the effects of the multipolarization of issues and
interests on the human rights agenda is perhaps best reflected by the
paucity of academic writings on international human rights as a focus
of intellectual concern during the two-and-a-half decades between the
UDHR and the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and
Co-operation in Europe.17 Nor can the dearth of such writings be
attributed to a general decline during that period in the study of international law. Numerous other issues, notably those relating to the
use of force, collective security, decolonization, self-determination,
the regulation of foreign investments, national control over natural
resources, and international involvement in civil wars all commanded
substantially more attention than did the study of human rights.
Indeed, the modern era of human rights, after the initial outpouring
typified by the UDHR and the Genocide Convention, genuinely can
be dated to the Helsinki Declaration. A puzzle worth asking and
seeking to resolve, then, is what explains the quiescence of
international human rights discourse between 1950 and 1975, and its
resurgence—and more importantly, sustenance—since then? For
reasons that I shall put forward later in this piece, the answer to this
17. See Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe Final Act, Aug. 1, 1975, 14
I.L.M. 1292 [hereinafter Final Act].
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puzzle is vital for any meaningful prognostication of the future of
human rights in our current international environment of economic
turmoil and transition in the distribution of moral and political power.
The answer to the puzzle, however deftly human rights proponents
have sought to avoid it, says a lot not only about human rights
discourse, but the international law project generally. That answer
essentially is that if there is any truth to the claim that law and legal
institutions invariably reflect the distribution and structures of power
within a society, this is especially the case for international law, and
trebly so for international human rights discourse. This is, of course,
a far cry from the dominant perspective among celebrants of the
human rights movement. International human rights law is often
presented as an innately moral and altruistic undertaking that challenges power. But, as they say, the proof of the pudding is in the eating;
so, let’s have a quick bite by reviewing the post-World War II
trajectory of international human rights discourse.
The insubstantiality of international human rights literature between 1950 and 1975 reflected the relative absence of its discourse in
the corridors of power. To be sure, lawyers and diplomats within the
Secretariat and the Legal Committee of the General Assembly and
those negotiating the texts of the ICCPR and ICESCR were representatives of the power structure, as were the politicians and
diplomats who occasionally invoked human rights rhetoric and norms
in the decolonization, anti-apartheid, and ―national liberation‖
struggles. But their place and influence on the totem pole of power
structures in international relations were essentially invisible when
compared to the rhetoric and demands for ―self determination,‖
―political independence,‖ ―territorial integrity,‖ economic nationalism, and the sovereign rights of the state. Nor were the states of the
West in any position to be vigorous advocates of human rights.
France and the United Kingdom, as exiting colonial powers, often
adopted recognizably anti-human rights practices, whether in Malaya,
Kenya, or Algeria; and the United States, as the successor imperial
state, found its mouth firmly glued shut by its internal racial
discrimination practices and the increasingly anti-human rights
policies it employed in the conduct of its wars in South-East Asia.
By 1974, however, these Western powers had more or less successfully extricated themselves from these shackles and could now front
as protectors of universal human rights. The initial framework was
straightforwardly political.
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The Helsinki Final Act was part of the package of détente or
―rapprochement‖ between the Soviet Bloc and the members of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. One of its seminal achievements
was to provide a legitimate human rights platform for the Western
states’ criticisms of the emigration policies of the Soviet Union
regarding Jews wishing to leave that country for Israel or the West. 18
This seeming concession by a ―superpower‖—that its regulation of
the ―right‖ of its nationals to emigrate to other countries was a proper
subject of international discourse—indubitably created a chink in the
hitherto absolutist position that many non-Western states had taken
regarding the meaning and scope of the non-interference language of
Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter. Events within the United
States made it possible to convert this concession into the flood of
human rights claims that significantly shaped international law
discourse over the last generation.
In August 1974, a president of the United States resigned his office
in order to avoid involuntary removal. The Congress became
effectively the most influential branch of the United States Government and it launched numerous investigations, the results of which
revealed extensive political corruptions dating over several decades
in the conduct of United States foreign policies. Of particular
significance were the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency
and of several large multinational corporations, whose conduct often
seemed to align United States institutions with governments and
persons thought to be immoral, unjust, or undemocratic. The 1976
elections confirmed the extent to which the American population had
become dissatisfied with its government. The Democratic Party, seen
since the 1930s as the more liberal and reform-minded of the two
dominant parties, scored substantial victories. Even more importantly, a little known governor from the South, who openly campaigned on his moral probity and his belief in the equal and civil
rights of all, was elected president. The Congress and the President
were now united in a desire to imbue the practice of American
politics with moral considerations. The creation of an Office for
Human Rights within the Department of State was one consequence,
thereby institutionalizing an advocacy center for the promotion of
18. Although the Final Act for the most part reaffirmed the then-standard clichés of
East–West relations on ―sovereignty‖ and the terms for ―friendly relations‖ among states, it
was notable for its provisions on the movement of peoples across borders on the basis of,
inter alia, ―humanitarian‖ considerations. Id.
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international human rights within the United States foreign policy
establishment.
The politics of morality did not last. By 1980, ―realism‖ had again
returned to center stage in thinking about the conduct of American
foreign relations.19 The election of President Reagan, who viewed the
Soviet Union as ―the evil empire‖ (and one of whose notable preelection on-camera gaffes was counting down to the unleashing of
bombs on that country), symbolized the reversion. Nor was this a
uniquely American phenomenon. The British had rejected a year
earlier a weak Labour Party in favor of the Conservative Party led by
―the Iron Lady,‖ Margaret Thatcher. France and Germany were
headed by nominally social democratic parties that were in fact
highly pragmatic and often worked in coalition with their ostensibly
more conservative oppositions. In short, this was the age of
―realism,‖ when there was in large measure—at least in the West—a
yearning for a return to Henry Kissinger’s brand of ―realpolitik.‖ It
may then be validly asked why there was not, at least in matters of
human rights, a reversion to the pre-1974 status quo. Why did not
the Helsinki Final Act and the Carter Administration, like the UDHR
and the Genocide Convention, constitute simply another ―Prague
Spring‖ for the cause of international human rights?
The answer lies in the differences between the zeitgeist that shaped
the power politics of the 1980s and 1990s, on the one hand, and that
which had been dominant during the 1950s and 1960s on the other.
Each zeitgeist, in turn, was formed by facts on the ground. Two
resulting structural elements of the interactions between facts and
ideas are worth focusing on. The first was the deconstitution of the
state as the locus of material power and resources, and the second
was the emergence of private entrepreneurs as possible heirs to the
exercise of such power.
In the 1980s, as contrasted with the 1950s and 1960s, the Soviet
Union, and the ideologies that it represented were in decline. The
political leadership manifestly was experiencing significant difficulties in its self-renewal and public legitimation. Central planning
and economic growth through heavy industrialization had stalled. It
had failed to create a consumer society that regularly met the basic
needs of the population. Externally, its ability to effectively
command the obedience, if not loyalty, of client states such as Poland
19. Cf. KENNETH N. WALTZ, THEORY OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS (1979).
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and Afghanistan were under severe challenge. Ultimately, the center
could no longer hold and the 1990s witnessed the disintegration of a
once ―superpower,‖ with cataclysmic consequences for both the
USSR and much of Eastern Europe, particularly for minority
populations in the former Republic of Yugoslavia. The consequence
of these breakups—especially their handling—was to strengthen the
rhetoric of the demand for (if not the regime of) international human
rights.
What was true about the disintegration of the Soviet Union was
equally so about the collection of states often referred to as ―the third
world,‖ ―nonaligned,‖ or ―developing countries.‖ These ―new states‖
of the 1950s and 1960s initially offered a lot of promise for the reconstitution of international society. Predominantly former colonies
of Western European powers, these states naturally had been
expected to ape (if not heartily embrace) the liberal democratic and
capitalist ethos of their colonizers. Their automatic requests for
membership in the United Nations system, and especially in the
Bretton Woods institutions, initially seemed to bear out these expectations. By the 1970s, however, few doubted that these expectations
were illusory. The internal politics of many of these states were
anything but liberal democratic. Most were being run by military
juntas, ―presidents for life,‖ or ―one party governments‖ whose
rhetoric, if not actual practice, tended towards ―socialism‖ or
―communism.‖ These tendencies often were buttressed by the votes
these states cast in international organizations. Although nominally
nonaligned, these votes, whether at the United Nations General
Assembly, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization, the International Labour Organization, the International
Monetary Fund, the World Bank, or for the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, seemed intended to favor the East and undercut the
West. As the 1980s began and the world found itself in another
economic crisis, there was little solicitude in the West to bail out
these autocratic societies. To the contrary, the economic crisis of the
1980s offered an opportunity in the West to have these countries cut
down to size. The articulation and enforcement of a particularized
international human rights agenda was one instrument deployed for
this purpose. But to understand how that was possible, one other
feature in the mindset of the 1980s and 1990s, as opposed to that of
the 1950s and 1960s, needs to be discussed. That mindset was about
the appropriate distribution of responsibility in the management of
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the affairs of a society between governmental institutions and private
actors.
As a teacher of International Business Transactions, I find that one
of those moments for dramatically demonstrating the dynamism of
international law arrives in the discussion of foreign direct investments. It is difficult to convey today to a student whose primary
concerns relate to the punishment of multinational corporations for
their antisocial behaviors (such as damage to the environment,
running sweatshops, or for engaging in bribery and corruption),
distinguishing between ―green field‖ investments and takeovers
through ―mergers and acquisitions,‖ protecting intellectual property
rights, and understanding the uses of the letter of credit, ―project
financing‖ (or the like), that these topics have not always been the
primary concerns of international business lawyers. How does one
convey what a different legal world she now inhabits from her
predecessors of the 1960s and 1970s? It may be that World War II
was fought to make the world safe for capitalism—at least American
style—but the vast majority of states came out of the war committed
to a central place for the government in the ―commanding heights‖ of
the economy. During those decades, the Government was not, and
simply could not, be a ―mere regulator.‖ It had to be actively
involved in planning and directing the economy, in the ownership of
essential economic assets, and in reserving to the nationals of the
country the ownership and control of assets deemed essential for
national interest and security. This consensus began to break down in
the late 1970s, in part as a reaction to the events described in the prior
two paragraphs of this essay.
President Carter of the United States began the process of
―deregulation,‖ and Prime Minister Thatcher of the United Kingdom
followed with ―privatization.‖20 By the early 1980s, President Ronald
Reagan of the United States no longer represented an outlier position
when he blithely asserted that ―government is not the solution to our
problem; government is the problem.‖21 International institutions
espoused this doctrine. So-called ―structural adjustment programs‖
had as their primary objective cutting governments down to size in
20. I have discussed this subject elsewhere. See Maxwell O. Chibundu, Law and the
Political Economy of Privatization in Sub-Saharan Africa, 21 MD. J. INT’L L. & TRADE 1
(1997).
21. Ronald Reagan, First Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 1981), available at http://www.
reaganlibrary.com/reagan/speeches/speech.asp?spid=6.
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the ―third world.‖22 It was a policy embraced and given intellectual
heft by the ―Washington Consensus,‖23 and thereafter, in the 1990s,
became neoliberal orthodoxy. That orthodoxy wholeheartedly embraced ―globalization,‖ seeing in the free movement of capital, goods,
and ideas the best promise for liberal democracy, which came to be
seen as the end for which human civilizations had been aiming. 24
Two core theses of the orthodoxy are worth emphasizing: first, the
best government is that which is least involved in the affairs of
society; and second, the international order functions best when it
minimizes the relevance of national boundaries and national political
institutions to the activities of members of the ―international community.‖ Neoliberalism anchors these values in its privileging of
―privatization,‖ while proponents of human rights endorse the same
values in its claim of a universal set of rights that are independent of
actual commitments by states.
In conversations with human rights activists and scholars, I am
struck by the vigor of their protestations at being lumped in the same
category as proponents of neoliberalism. I am never entirely sure
whether such protests are disingenuous or whether they reflect
genuine unawareness of the shared principles on which both contemporary human rights and neoliberal philosophies rest. That they
are cut out of the same cloth, it seems to me, is indisputable. A
central plank of international human rights at the beginning of the
1990s was the delegitimization of the state. Sovereignty, that
abstraction in which the mystique of state power is often shrouded,
was seen as the enemy.25 The future of human rights in international
society was often presented as resting on the activism of ―civil
society,‖ an amorphous term that embraces virtually any organization
whose power or influence does not derive directly from the
government. In practical terms, however, the opposition was often to
a particular kind of government: those who were, for any number of
reasons, out of favor in Washington or London. The difficulty lay in
trying to provide sufficiently coherent philosophical generalizations
22. I have also discussed this issue elsewhere. See Maxwell O. Chibundu, Law in
Development: On Tapping, Gourding, and Serving Palm Wine, 29 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L.
167 (1997).
23. See, e.g., James Gathii, Human Rights, the World Bank, and the Washington
Consensus: 1949–1999, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 144 (2000).
24. See generally FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992).
25. Cf. Louis Henkin, That “S” Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and Human
Rights, Et Cetera, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 7 (1999).
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to explain those third world governments that were acceptable and
those that were not. In time, the appropriate language, such as
―antidemocratic,‖ ―pariah,‖ and ―rogue,‖ was furnished less by
human rights scholars than by neoliberals and neoconservatives.
But the ultimate linking up of human rights with particular
political preferences endorsed by neoliberalism came in the context
of so-called ―humanitarian intervention.‖ The trip down this road in
which human rights proponents heartily espoused the use of force in
the service of their causes, although predictable, was rather gradual,
and itself reflects the symbiosis between the agendas of political and
military might and of ideas in international relations. International
human rights scholars and practitioners may initially have seen their
primary function in terms of persuading governments to comply with
their legal or moral obligations, through ―shaming‖ by the publication
of reports, press releases, and peer reviews. The successes in the
United States, however, of using the courts to impose civil sanctions
under the ―Alien Tort Statute‖ for alleged violations of international
human rights laws and norms,26 and the cooptation of the Security
Council into creating ad hoc international tribunals to prosecute and
impose criminal penalties on individuals alleged to have been
responsible for ―crimes against humanity‖ in the civil strife that
occurred in the former Republic of Yugoslavia and in Rwanda,27
opened up new vistas for the enforcement of human rights. When
European countries such as the United Kingdom, Spain, and Belgium
followed suit with attempts to prosecute such renowned purported
human rights violators as Augusto Pinochet of Chile, and when a
significant majority of the members of the United Nations through
the adoption of the Rome Treaty created a permanent court to
criminally punish, inter alia, notorious violations of human rights
such as those that had allegedly occurred in the former Republic of
Yugoslavia, the idea of a punitive human rights enforcement regime
had become a reality. Indeed, a common mantra became the need to
do away with ―impunity‖ for human rights violators. It seemed but a
small step to move from coercive judicial enforcement of human

26. See, e.g., Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). See generally M. O.
Chibundu, Making Customary International Law Through Adjudication: A Structural
Inquiry, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 1069 (1999).
27. See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) (establishing the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia); S.C. Res. 955, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) (establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda).
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rights claims through post hoc litigation to preventive military
intervention to forestall such violations.
The ethnically and religiously driven massacres in Rwanda and
Bosnia-Herzegovina, the degree of which were at least attributable to
the passivity of the United Nations ―peacekeeping‖ forces, provided
easily graspable instances of the horrendous consequences that can
ensue from seeming international indifference, and suggested the
possible benefits of vigorous preventive measures. Human rights
proponents were thus at the forefront of urging the Security Council
and members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to engage in
active military intervention to forestall any extensive human rights
violations in Kosovo. They took similar positions with regard to the
various civil wars in Africa, including those in Sierra Leone, Côte
d’Ivoire, Liberia, and, of course, Darfur in the western part of Sudan.
But there is good reason to believe that human rights activists have
come to see intervention as an end, not as a means to some broader
objective. Thus, once the occupation has occurred, there appears to
be a loss of interest in the human rights violations that continue and
occasionally bubble up to the surface when active fighting resumes.
While we may hear of a lot of purported human rights violations in
Darfur, there is a veil of silence with the no-less-egregious violations
going on in Somalia, and those that go on in the Democratic Republic
of the Congo are surfaced only when news reports about active
fighting make taking note of them unavoidable.
Although not immediately self-evident, there is now good reason
to believe that we may be in the midst of significant changes in our
conceptualization of human rights—at least, we ought to be. If such
a change does occur, it will be because the last half-dozen years have
been forcing human rights activists to confront, however reluctantly,
the extent to which over the last two decades their articulations of
human rights norms and legalities have been grounded on a highly
particularized and parochial view of violators and victims. The
prototype of the human rights violator was a self-appointed ―third
world‖ dictator and his underlings. To this group were added party
leaders, apparatchiks, or religious oligarchies who governed with iron
fists what effectively were one-party states. The victims were the
disfavored opponents—usually presented as ―democrats‖ or ―moderates‖—or socio-cultural minorities or women. International human
rights thus stood as a bulwark against the arbitrary and otherwise
unchecked exercise of totalitarian power by rulers against the ruled in
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undemocratic societies. International human rights had to be
articulated in universal terms because otherwise those who lived in
democratic societies would lack the legitimacy and standing to speak
for the silenced voices of the victims of repressive regimes.
If the so-called ―global war on terrorism‖ has lasting lessons to
impart, one of them surely has to be the artificiality—indeed
parochialism—of the standard trope that the violation of human
rights is a propensity peculiar to dictatorships. It is impossible to
deny that much of the conduct of that ―war‖ by unassailably ―liberal
democratic‖ states runs counter to what typically has been thought of
as international human rights norms, values, or even rules.28 One of
the things that is especially worthy of note has to be the extent to
which human rights scholarship, induced by domestic constitutional
law scholarship in the West (especially the United States), has in fact
been forced to engage not simply in debating the moral validity of the
conduct, but in actually parsing the legal elements of the conduct.
The consequence has been the nuanced application of texts and
practices in order to determine the legitimacy of highly dissected and
particularistic behavior. In the process, it becomes evident that there
are differences between norms and rules, morals and law, preferences
and commands. Ideas of derogation and of possible justifications for
derogation, of exigencies and normality, of utilitarianism and
deontology begin to creep into the discourse. Because human rights
concerns are no longer monochromatically about ―them‖ (the
―other‖), but also about ―us,‖ it becomes less suspect and more
acceptable to acknowledge the possibilities of difference. Preachers,
romantic poets and perhaps politicians may have the license to
engage in rhetoric in matters relating to ―us,‖ but lawyers typically do
not. International human rights lawyers, when they had the field
entirely to themselves, could breezily avoid having to confront the
realities of life as lived rather than as imagined; after all, prior to this
decade, the subjects of the discourse had little voice in shaping the
discourse.29 That Olympian stance is no longer tenable both because
the ―other‖ has been given voice by the recent conduct of liberal
28. It serves little purpose here to recite or rehearse the debates about the morality or
legality of such conducts as ―extraordinary renditions‖/disappearances, preventive
detentions, ―enhanced interrogation methods‖/torture, ―targeted assassinations‖/extrajudicial
killings, and the like. Whole library shelves can now be filled with books and articles that
take varying positions on these subjects.
29. See, e.g., MAKAU MUTUA, HUMAN RIGHTS: A POLITICAL AND CULTURAL CRITIQUE
(2002). See also Chibundu, supra note 26, at 1108–09.
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democratic states in the ―war‖ against terrorism,30 and because the
resulting defensiveness of these societies has transformed simplistic
moralisms into parsed legalities. Confronted by scholars who operate
well within the mainstream and the corridors of intellectual and
political power, human rights scholars can no longer rest on the
assertion of moral bromides, nor be dismissive of countervailing
arguments about the need or desirability of exploring necessary tradeoffs between the protections of rights and of other societal virtues. 31
In short, the future of human rights discourse will have to dispense
with the Manichaean attitude that has long dominated much of its
discourse.
A second likely spin-off for human rights discourse on the
methods adopted in confronting ―terrorism‖ and in waging the allied
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq is that they have laid bare for nonWesterners, as much as for Westerners, in just how much raiment the
emperor actually is clothed. The silent voices of the non-Western
world may reasonably have been presumed to support (or at least
acquiesce) in the framing of the human rights discourse as long as the
idea of human rights could, without too much violence to the concept
of truth, be claimed to be uniformly universal in application. That
position can scarcely be maintained following the events in such
places as Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo Bay, and the persistence in
the so-called ―antiterrorism‖ policies of several Western societies of
differential treatment for alleged violations of such laws on the basis
of classifications grounded in nationality or religion.32 As has
become evident in recent years, the internet has reduced the cost and
opened up the means for mass communication to many well outside
the main cosmopolitan communication centers. The extent to which
these new participants view and treat human rights discourse, either
as part of their own cultural life or with skeptical (or even outright
cynical) distrust, will have a lot to say about the future of that
discourse. Put another way, it is unlikely that human rights in the
future will remain an essentially rhetorical discourse carried out
30. The dramatic testimonies of those imprisoned at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, or
otherwise ―interrogated‖ as part of the war on terrorism give voice to this ―other.‖ See, e.g.,
Mark Danner, US Torture: Voices from the Black Sites, 56 N.Y. REV. BOOKS (2009) (book
review).
31. See, e.g., Henry Paul Monaghan, Article III and Supranational Judicial Review, 107
COLUM. L. REV. 833 (2007); TORTURE: A COLLECTION (Sanford Levinson ed., 2004).
32. See generally Maxwell O. Chibundu, For God, for Country, for Universalism:
Sovereignty as Solidarity in Our Age of Terror, 56 FLA. L. REV. 883 (2004).
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almost exclusively by and among the elites of the West about the
goodness and altruism of the privileged for the welfare of the other.
That discourse will have to engage with and reflect upon the
multiplicities of realities that exist as a matter of course in the daily
and routine lives of plural societies. The extent to which we can
prepare our students to be informed participants in that discourse is,
in my view, a relevant determinant of the course the discourse will
take. In the remainder of this essay, then, I want to take on two
issues that seem to me highly relevant in how well current human
rights scholars, in particular, and international law academics in
general, can help tutor our students for a legal and social environment
that I believe is likely to be quite different from that which has
existed in the last two decades.
THE PRACTITIONER AS ACADEMIC
The protection of human rights, as a political ideal, has been
developed primarily within two discursive disciplines: those of moral
philosophy and of law. The former is squarely located within the
―ivory tower‖ of the academy, the latter less comfortably so. Law is
a highly instrumentalist profession. Its practitioners exist to solve
practical problems. Although the training of legal practitioners is
now an academic undertaking, few lawyers have been entirely
comfortable with viewing legal issues in abstract or essentially
conceptual terms. This tension is evident in conceptions about the
UDHR and human rights law in general. I want to suggest that the
ways in which knowledge about human rights and its possibilities are
acquired and communicated have been and will continue to be
consequential for its development.
The UDHR, I have argued, is fundamentally an aspirational
document. Not surprisingly, then, much of the writing about the
UDHR in particular, and human rights generally, prior to 1966 was
devoted primarily to the explication of the underlying moral and
philosophical arguments. In its seminal 1980 opinion in Filártiga v.
Peña-Irala, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, however, presented international law as a bouillabaisse of
more or less indistinguishable legal ingredients of which the UDHR
is, for practical purposes an element.33 The court cursorily shunted
aside well understood distinctions in international law between policy
33. Filártiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 882 (2d Cir. 1980).
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declarations and legally binding pronouncements such as those
embodied in treaties and customary international law. This error,
although subsequently recognized by other courts, has been decisive
in shaping the understanding of international human rights law in the
country with the greatest power to coerce compliance. This doctrinal
confusion was compounded by a second: under United States
domestic law, if the grant of authority to a court to hear a category of
cases necessarily entails the existence of substantive enforceable
rights under that grant of jurisdiction, how are the substantive
elements of those rights to be determined?34 The Filártiga case had
been brought by the Center for Constitutional Rights, a United States
domestic civil rights litigation boutique that had not previously
litigated any international law case. The jurisdictional statute on
which the claim was grounded was a little-understood historical
artifact about which there had been virtually no litigation.35 But, in
the wake of the post-Helsinki human rights fervor, neither substance
nor jurisdiction could stand in the way of a court that had determined
that ―[i]n the modern age, humanitarian and practical considerations
have combined to lead the nations of the world to recognize that
respect for fundamental human rights is in their individual and
collective interest,‖ and which therefore concluded: ―Our holding
today, giving effect to a jurisdictional provision enacted by our First
Congress, is a small but important step in the fulfillment of the
ageless dream to free all people from brutal violence.‖36
Law, of course, is about authority, and judicial opinions furnish
authoritative text for the exercise of power. What distinguishes a
lawyer from a philosopher is often less their commitments to any
particular vision of society, but that the lawyer believes that she can
in fact bring that vision into being not simply through the force of
imagination or argument, but through the coercive use of power that
her arguments can call into being. The capacity to do so is an art, one
that is learned not through solitary engagement with text, but through
active involvement with society. The life of the law, Holmes said to
Harvard students over a century ago, is not logic, but experience. 37

34. See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The
resolution of these complex issues remains cloudy almost thirty years later. See, e.g., Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
35. See IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
36. Filártiga, 630 F.2d at 890.
37. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 465 (1897).
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This mantra has gained particular salience during the last thirty years
as clinical and so-called ―experiential‖ learning have become core
features of legal education in the United States. The Filártiga
decision and the human rights litigation industry that it spawned
effectively transformed the UDHR from an aspirational to a legal
instrument, and the discourse of international human rights became as
much a practitioner-oriented doctrinal undertaking as a philosophically engaged pedagogy. The involvement of practitioners, it
can be said, enhances the credibility of relevant courses, and in part
explains the flourishing of human rights courses in American law
schools. But it may also have weakened the need for philosophical
engagements with the assertion of rights. A ―right‖ has become little
more than what the speaker believes she is entitled to, and
foundational tools for distinguishing between ―is‖ and ―ought‖
amount to little more than, in the best case, who can shout loudest or
longest, and in most cases, who can command or wield the greater
coercive power.
As already explained, the process of active enforcement of human
rights claims was neither limited to the United States nor to the
judiciary. The extension of enforcement in the 1990s to include
resorting to coercive military and political power (with the use of
economic sanctions being most favored) was a systemic change not
only for international human rights, but for international law
generally. This gave added credibility to the idea of international law
as law and undoubtedly has been partly responsible for the place that
it now has as a central component of legal education. But this sense
of empowerment extends beyond the classroom. The idea of an
―international community‖ is often invoked as a cellular organism
that provides a competing center of power for the oppressed within
national states. Disciples of this international community supposedly
form a no-longer ―invisible college‖ of ―transnational networks‖ of
persons and organizations dedicated to distilling and propagating the
shared norms and values of international liberalism. An argument
can thus be made that since the organization of this conference fits
within this dominant mold, this writer/participant perhaps ought to
take seriously the caution of Shakespeare’s Fool in King Lear: ―Let
go thy hold when a great wheel runs down a hill, lest it break thy
neck with following it; but the great one that goes up the hill, let him
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draw thee after.‖38
And yet, perhaps purely as an academic exercise, this teacher
cannot help asking if the future of international human rights discourse is bound to follow the last twenty years. That evidence exists
to suggest that we might be at a fork in the road of the development
of the international legal order seems indisputable. If our confidence
in the ability of liberal ideals to organize the international legal order
was bolstered by the resilience of the military, political, and
economic institutions that underpinned it, the extent to which liberal
states, when under pressure, have kept faith with those ideals over the
last decade should surely give us some pause about how they—let
alone other societies—will react in the gathering storms of economic
and political instabilities. In any event, I am an academic, and I
cannot help asking: ―what if . . . ?‖
THE FUTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS PEDAGOGY
In a recent review of books dealing with that most ultimate of
human rights crimes, genocide, Malcolm Bull succinctly captures the
dilemma of the effort to regulate not only that crime, but the entire
human rights project. ―Feeling that nothing like the Holocaust should
ever be allowed to happen again, the UN Convention on Genocide
tried to define exactly what it was that had happened.‖39 But
consider: ―If someone is sitting in their bedroom planning the
annihilation of half the population, it is probably better described as
fantasy than intent. On the other hand, soldiers who take no prisoners
when clearing the survivors out of a bombarded village may have no
sense that they are engaged in anything other than a messy military
operation, and be quite indifferent to the identity of those they kill.‖40
So, a legal order that is determined to punish genocide will have to
decide whether to punish fantasies (a crime of thought), soldiers
behaving as soldiers in times of war, both, or neither. One can rely
on the text, giving it whatever ―reasonable‖ ―good faith‖ interpretation it can bear; essentially ignore the text and purport to be
―purposive,‖ thereby raising while begging the question of what
informs and constrains purposiveness; punish all who arguably are

38. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR act 2, sc. 4.
39. See Malcolm Bull, Ultimate Choice, LONDON REV. BOOKS (Feb. 9, 2006) (book
review).
40. Id.
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connected with the wrongdoing; or arbitrarily select, on a so-called
―case by case‖ basis, what interpretive tool to employ in any given
situation. In an environment in which instrumentalism is the object,
and in which one is not concerned with over-deterrence, the last two
approaches recommend themselves. As long as one is unable to
envision oneself or those close to oneself as potential defendants,
then the last two choices will serve the purpose. If one can
conceivably see oneself as a possible defendant, then a vigorous
argument as to which of the first two makes the better sense should
ensue.41 But should a lawmaker or interpreter ever situate herself as a
potential law violator?
Much of the discourse in international law, and international
human rights in particular, elide these troublesome questions.
Retrospectively finding particular practices abhorrent, condemnatory,
and even subject to the imposition of sanction, there is in international law argumentation today a tendency to assert that the
conduct at issue has been inherently and always universally wrong.
Universal morality is said to provide the lens for international
legality, at least in the context of human rights. One encounters in
these discourses of international law a rather paradoxical attitude.
Having found a text that superficially seems relevant to an issue that
they confront, students almost never seem to actually parse the text.
They take the text as conclusively resolving that issue. The only
remaining issue for them is not so much the meaning of the text, but
where in a legal hierarchy to situate it.
A quite frequent experience in the classroom, or while sitting as a
moot court judge, is of a student who argues vigorously and with
complete self-confidence that the UDHR, in its entirety, is ―jus
cogens‖ because it contains ―peremptory norms,‖ or that the provisions of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women is ―customary international law‖
because it has been signed and ratified by a majority of the member
states of the United Nations. If you point to a specific provision
within the UDHR, such as Article 23(1) (―[e]veryone has the right to
work‖), and the student concedes that such a ―right‖ does not
41. The popularity of the crimes of ―enticement‖ and ―glorification‖ is a testimonial to
who calls the tunes; surely it is not those who believe that their thoughts and arguments will
ever be sufficiently controversial to arouse the ire of the powerful. And so there is freedom
of speech and thought, but only so long as the position espoused does not stray too far from
the accepted mean.
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constitute ―jus cogens,‖ she then either completely abandons the
argument, or dogmatically maintains that the right exists under law
even though she is unable to explain the legal source of the right.
One of the consequences of framing norms as law is thus an
unfortunate incapacity to distinguish among sources of ―rights,‖ and
to place those ―rights‖ within their proper context. Deprived of an
artificially assumed essentialist position, and operating outside the
pragmatism that cultural embeddedness unconsciously confers, my
student finds herself unable to resort to those lawyering skills that
come to her as second nature in her domestic law classes. She fails to
appreciate that in international human rights law, no less than in
domestic law, she must begin but almost never end with the text; that
there is nothing intrinsically self-evident about the meaning of text;
that the text was crafted as a compromise among varied and often
competing interests; that, as such, texts are expressive but never
definitive of contested values; and that the appropriate construction
of any text is as much dependent on time and place as it is on the
particular terms employed in the text. This failing, of course, is not
the student’s alone. In fact, it is a reflection of the dominant attitude
of human rights scholars and practitioners to the conduct of
international human rights discourse.
One possible consequence of the waning of the post-Cold War
world order may well be to return to the teacher and her students the
capacity to interrogate text and to situate it rightfully within the
socio-cultural milieu that it seeks to regulate. If so, it would be a
welcome change.
The practitioner in the classroom is indisputably a valuable asset in
the training of international lawyers. It may be that the current
tendency of human rights lawyers to be monochromatic in their view
of human rights is simply a stage in the development of the
international human rights legal order. Perhaps as courts confront
more prosecutions, judges will not compulsively believe that their
sole duty is to vindicate some uniform and universalized conception
of human rights, and academic institutions will not continue to
believe that the only practitioners worth having in their classrooms
are those who represent the plaintiff or the prosecutor. In any event,
it is likely that as different socio-economic orders are able to mount
meaningful challenges to the idea of what constitutes international
power and success, the vision of international law, as it has in the
past, will change accordingly.
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CONCLUSIONS
Sixty years of the development of international human rights under
the auspices of the UDHR, at a minimum, suggest the following.
First, the UDHR is better seen as a set of principles, not a legal
decree. We ought to take seriously its invitation for the participation
of all, not simply the elite or the materially well off, in negotiating
accommodations among a full range of claims that make possible the
enjoyment of peace, security, and happiness within a just international order. Secondly, respect for the dignity of the person exists
not in the coercive compulsion of compliance, but in the persuasive
explication of why the particular respect being sought or accorded is
in the interest of the particular person or group. If international
human rights are to serve worthy purposes, the concept of ―human
dignity‖ must not become another one of those vacuous vessels into
which, in the name of altruism, particularistic preferences are
asserted as ―law,‖ but should reflect the actual conditions within
which peoples struggle to make sense of their daily existence. This
exhortation is no less true in dealing with societies than it is in
dealing with individuals. The reality is that whether we choose to
accept it or not, the ―dignity‖ of the individual cannot be wrenched
from the sense the individual feels about respect for the community
of which she is a part, whether that membership is by choice, by
prescription, or by affect. Thirdly, precisely because human rights
are as much about interests as they are about ideas, institutions, and
practices, it behooves human rights scholars and practitioners
(including the students and acolytes whose views they seek to shape)
to think and learn about social realities that transcend their own
parochial perspectives of what constitutes the good or the bad.
Human rights scholars are not avenging angels. They should be
engaged participants in a much broader discourse that explores not
only politics and moral philosophy, but history, economics, sociology, religion, culture, and the full range of the humanities. This
requires an approach to the idea of human dignity not as a monochromatic exercise in the resolution of conflicts between the
individual and the pariah state, but a deeper and often necessarily
sympathetic and particularistic understanding of the conflicts and
accommodations with which persons and societies are regularly
engaged, and which is intrinsic in the process of living. That process
cannot be abstracted in terms of the lives of decision-makers and
opinion-shapers in the metropolises of the world. Finally, legal
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academics involved in the study of international human rights
(including the many practitioners who act as such) have a profound
obligation to engage with and encourage students in the particularistic exploration of the rich texts of the discourse, rather than in
presenting the discourse as a Manichaean discipline in which
invariably the good ―us‖ seek to eviscerate the barbarian ―them.‖

